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1 Introduction
The phenomenon of tax evasion represents a serious problem for several coun-
tries. Having as a main consequence a reduction of the tax revenue, it neg-
atively affects a correct functioning of the public sector: it hurts the supply
of education, health care and services in general. In turn, this contributes,
together with other factors, to an increase of economic inequality.
In this paper, we try and look at some aspects of the problem through
a mathematical-modelling approach. Specifically, we discuss a kinetic-type
model for economic exchanges in a closed society in the presence of taxation
and redistribution, within which occurrence of tax evasion to various extents
is assumed: we admit the possibility that different citizens pay different per-
centages of the taxes they should pay.
We emphasize that the illegal practice under consideration involves in fact
a large number of interacting agents. These include clearly the evaders them-
selves, but in addition also all other citizens who, by the situation, are deprived
of the access to the benefits deriving from the revenue redistribution. In view
of this and of the various levels at which it can take place, tax evasion can be
thought of as an example of complex system. With this denomination, systems
composed by a high number of heterogeneous units are meant, whose collective
and macroscopic behavior is not derivable from the simple summation of the
single units properties, but inherently depends on their nonlinear interplay.
An interaction-based approach seems to be quite a natural one in the study of
economic questions, but it was only during the last decades, especially thanks
to the new opportunities offered by the increased computer power, that it
started to be pursued. Arguments in favour and related work can be found
e.g. in [1,3,15,18,19,20,22]. The technical tools more frequently employed in
connection with this approach are agent-based computational algorithms and
simulations, possibly combined with complex networks theory. Also, starting
in the mid-1990s an interdisciplinary research field called econophysics has
been growing, which explores the dynamical behaviour of economic and finan-
cial markets by means of methods taken from statistical mechanics and gas
kinetic theory, see e.g. [12,13,16,24].
Adopting here a mathematics-supported complex system perspective, we
aim at deriving and explaining the emergence of a population’s aggregate fea-
ture like the income distribution, as a result of the whole of economic exchanges
and interactions which take place between the individuals. More specifically,
our focus here is on the effects that the heterogeneity of taxpayer behaviors
has on the income distribution profiles of the categories of individuals evading
to different degrees. To this end we build on our previous work, incorporating
suitable additional facets into the models discussed in [4,5,6,7,8]. We also em-
phasize that our goal here is mainly a methodological one: more than perfectly
representing real world features, we aim at constructing a tool endowed with
explorative ability. Our model in fact has this character. Indeed, the possibil-
ity of finding numerical solutions which evolve from differently chosen “initial
conditions” and in the presence of differently tuned parameters amounts to
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the ability to forecast the emergence of different scenarios. In turn, this can
give insights as to which policies could be adopted to favour or prevent desired
and undesired trends.
The tax evasion process is the object of a large amount of literature. Works
among those which involve agent based modeling and simulations include e.g.
[11,14,17,25], to name but a few. Specific aspects therein investigated concern
the occurrence of behavioral changes of agent types with diverse moral atti-
tude, due to imitation or also to some audit procedure. In particular, in [17]
and [25] a variant of the Ising model originally developed within the theory
of magnetism is considered. In that context, each spin represents a citizen,
which can be either in the tax compliant state +1 or in the tax evader state
−1. Citizens undergo transitions from +1 to −1 caused by imitation of their
nearest neighbours, and from −1 to +1 induced by tax audits. Indeed, the
consequence of an audit on an evader is assumed to be the fact that she/he
will remain honest for a certain number of steps. This approach is helpful for
the analysis of evasion phenomena in relation to local interaction and external
controls, but not for studying the effect of evasion on the income distribution
as we do here.
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we describe the model and
some of its analytical properties. In Section 3 we report and discuss results
from a set of numerical solutions. Section 4 contains our conclusions.
2 The model
This section is devoted to a short description of the model proposed. More
details on the primary mechanism underlying it can be found in our papers [4,
5,6,7,8]. We point out however that in [4,5,6] the phenomenon of tax evasion
was not taken into account, whereas in [7,8] all individuals were assumed to
engage to the same degree in a kind of evasion different from that dealt with
here.1 The main novelty here is given by the assumption of the existence of
different degrees of evasion.
The totality of individuals (supposed to remain constant in time, in fact
during the time period under consideration) is divided into a number n of
classes, each one characterized by its average income, the average incomes
being the positive numbers r1 < r2 < ... < rn, and, in turn, every income
class is divided into a number m of sectors characterized by possible evasion
behaviors.
We denote by xαj the fraction of individuals belonging to the j-th income
class and to the α-th evasion behavior sector. We will say for brevity that xαj
is the fraction of individuals of type (j, α), also called (j, α)-individuals, the
number of different groups being n×m.
1 In [7,8] a kind of evasion was considered, which provides advantage to both the partic-
ipants in a transaction, as it sometimes happens in relation to value added taxes. Here, we
consider evasion of individuals who under-declare their income.
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We suppose here that the evasion behavior of each individual remains con-
stant in time. In contrast, individuals may move through different income
classes. The model is formulated by a system of n × m ordinary differential
equations describing the variation in time of xαj for j = 1, ..., n and α = 1, ..,m.
Such a variation is the result of direct economic interactions, in which pairs of
individuals exchange some money. And is affected as well by the payment of
taxes (in some cases, the due taxes and in other cases, partial quotes of them)
and by the revenue redistribution, represented in the real world by healthcare,
education and services in general. More specifically, the dynamic process is as
follows: a whole of interactions between pairs of individuals occur simultane-
ously: for any h and k in {1, ..., n}, for any β and γ in {1, ...,m} individuals
belonging to the h-th income class and the β-th evasion sector meet individuals
of the k-th income class and the γ-th evasion sector and some money exchange
between such pairs takes place. How many of these economic exchanges do we
have? If at the considered time the fraction of (h, β)-individuals is xβh and
the fraction of (k, γ)-individuals is xγk , the number of encounters of these two
categories of individuals is the product xβhx
γ
k . And any single encounter con-
tributes, albeit to a very small extent, to a change of the fraction of individuals
in some income classes. The differential equations contain several parameters,
which express for example transition probabilities, the probability that in an
encounter between two individuals of different classes the one or the other is
paying, the tax rates relative to the different income classes and the percent-
ages of evasion.
They take the form
dxαj
dt
=
n∑
h,k=1
m∑
β,γ=1
(
C
(j,α)
(h,β);(k,γ) + T
(j,α)
[(h,β);(k,γ)](x)
)
xβhx
γ
k − xαj
n∑
k=1
m∑
γ=1
xγk , (1)
for j = 1, ..., n and α = 1, ..,m, where
• for any h, k, j = 1, ..., n and any α, β, γ = 1, ...,m, the coefficient
C
(j,α)
(h,β);(k,γ) ∈ [0,+∞)
expresses the probability that an (h, β)-individual will belong to the group
(j, α) as a consequence of a direct interaction with an (k, γ)-individual.
These coefficients satisfy
∑n
j=1
∑m
α C
(j,α)
(h,β);(k,γ) = 1 for any fixed (h, β), (k, γ);
• for any h, k, j = 1, ..., n and any α, β, γ = 1, ...,m, the function
T
(j,α)
[(h,β);(k,γ)](x) : R
n×m → R
expresses the variation in the group (j, α) due to the taxation and redistribu-
tion process associated to an interaction between an (h, β)-individual with an
(k, γ)-individual.
These functions are continuous and satisfy
∑n
j=1
∑m
α T
(j,α)
[(h,β);(k,γ)](x) = 0 for
any fixed (h, β), (k, γ) and x ∈ Rn×m.
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A particular choice of the C
(j,α)
(h,β);(k,γ)’s and the T
(j,α)
[(h,β);(k,γ)](x)’s will be
proposed below. Before doing it, we need to introduce and motivate some
further terms.
Similarly as in [7,8] we first define for h, k = 1, ..., n certain coefficients ph,k,
aimed to specify the probability that in an encounter between an individual
of the h-th income class and one of the k-th class, the one who pays is the
former. We take
ph,k = min{rh, rk}/4rn ,
with the exception of the terms pj,j = rj/2rn for j = 2, ..., n−1, ph,1 = r1/2rn
for h = 2, ..., n, pn,k = rk/2rn for k = 1, ..., n− 1, p1,k = 0 for k = 1, ..., n and
ph,n = 0 for h = 1, ..., n. The introduction of these coefficients implies that,
with only reference here to the income class (and independently of the evasion
sector), for each h− k pair there is
– a probability denoted by ph,k ∈ [0, 1] that the h-individual will transfer
some money to the k-th one,
– a probability pk,h ∈ [0, 1] that the k-individual will transfer some money
to the h-th one,
– a probability 1− ph,k − pk,h ∈ [0, 1] that the two do not exchange money.
Correspondingly, we are assuming that for any h ∈ {1, ..., n} and any k ∈
{1, ..., n} the frequency of payment of individuals of the h-th income class
to individuals of the k-th income class is a fixed one. We could call this a
compartmental representative agent behavior (see in this connection [10,23]).
Then, we introduce S (with S << (ri+1 − ri) for all i = 1, ..., n), the
amount of money that in each direct transaction one individual is supposed
to pay to another. The individual who receives the money is expected to pay
a part of this as a tax to the government. If this individual belongs to the
k-th income class, we may for sake of simplicity assume that he should pay an
amount corresponding to S τk, τk being the tax rate of his income class.
At this point we notice that in a tax compliance case the effect of a direct
interaction with an individual of the h-th income class paying S to one of
the k-th class and this paying the due tax would be equal to that of the
first individual paying an amount S (1− τk) to the k-th income class one and
paying as well a quantity S τk to the government or equivalently, due to the
redistribution, to the community of individuals.2
Being interested in a tax evasion case study, we now introduce, beside the
tax rates τk, some other parameters. For any α = 1, ...,m let
θev(α) ∈ [0, 1]
denote the percentage of the due taxes payed by individuals characterized
by an evasion behavior index α. Then, we define for any k = 1, ..., n and
α = 1, ...,m,
θk,α = θev(α) τk . (2)
2 Actually, in this model all individuals, but those of the n-th income class benefit from
the redistribution. Differently, also individuals of the n-th class could advance to a higher
class, but this is no possible.
6 Short form of author list
The quantity θk,α in (2) expresses the fraction a (k, α)-individual actually pays
as a tax; this percentage depends both on the income class represented by the
index k and on the evasion index α.
Example 1 As an example to illustrate the situation, take m = 3 and consider
three evasion behaviors, described by
θev(1) = 1 , θev(2) = 1/2 , θev(3) = 1/4 . (3)
In such a case one would have
– individuals in the first sector paying all they should and not evading at all,
– individuals in the second sector paying half of what they should,
– individuals in the third sector paying one quarter of what they should.
The coefficients C
(j,α)
(h,β);(k,γ)’s can now be defined: the only nonzero ones
among them are:
C
(j,α)
(j+1,α);(k,β) = pj+1,k
S (1− θk,β)
rj+1 − rj , (4)
C
(j,α)
(j,α);(k,β) = 1− pk,j
S (1− θj,α)
rj+1 − rj − pj,k
S (1− θk,β)
rj − rj−1 , (5)
C
(j,α)
(j−1,α);(k,β) = pk,j−1
S (1− θj−1,α)
rj − rj−1 . (6)
We point out that
- in (4), C
(j,α)
(j+1,α);(k,β) is defined only for j ≤ n− 1 and k ≤ n− 1;
- in the expression of C
(j,α)
(j,α);(k,β) in (5), the second addendum is present
only for j ≤ n− 1 and k ≥ 2, whereas the third addendum is present only for
j ≥ 2 and k ≤ n− 1;
- in (6), C
(j,α)
(j−1,α);(k,β) is defined only for j ≥ 2 and k ≥ 2;
- in (4)− (6), the indices α and β take any value in {1, ...,m}.
We also emphasize that the coefficients ph,k enter in the formulae (4), (5), (6)
in such a way that their effect can be also interpreted as weighting the amount
of money exchanged. In other words, the situation is the same one would have
assuming the frequency of payment of individuals independent on the income
class, but with the amount of money paid in each transaction by individuals
of the h-th income class to individuals of the k-th income class equal to ph,kS
instead of S. The specific choice of ph,k adopted here is suggested by the phe-
nomenological observation that typically poor people pay and earn less than
rich people.
We take the functions T
(j,α)
[(h,β);(k,γ)](x) as
T
(j,α)
[(h,β);(k,γ)](x) =
ph,k S θk,γ∑n
i=1
∑m
λ=1 x
λ
i
(
xαj−1
(rj − rj−1) −
xαj
(rj+1 − rj)
)
(7)
+ ph,k S θk,γ
(
δh,j+1δα,β
rh − rj −
δh,jδα,β
rh − rj−1
) ∑n−1
i=1
∑m
λ=1 x
λ
i∑n
i=1
∑m
λ=1 x
λ
i
,
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with δi,j denoting the Kronecker delta. In the r.h.s. of (7), h > 1 and the terms
involving the index j − 1 [respectively, j + 1] are effectively present only for
j − 1 ≥ 1 [respectively, j + 1 ≤ n]. The indices α, β and γ take any value in
{1, ...,m}.
Remark 1 It may be helpful stressing here the fact that, even if the equations
(1) describe migrations of aggregate fractions of individuals, in fact a proba-
bilistic micro-interaction modelling underlies the dynamical process expressed
by these equations.
The right hand sides of (1) contain quadratic [and other nonlinear] terms,
exactly because they give account of a large number of pairwise interactions
[and, through the taxation and redistribution process, also of interactions in-
volving more individuals]. For example, the origin of the coefficients C
(j,α)
(h,β);(k,γ)
(which refer to direct money exchange) is the following. The interaction be-
tween an (h, α)-individual and a (k, β)-individual with the (h, α)-individual
paying, produces the variation of the fraction of individuals in some groups
(in general, four). Indeed, the (h, α)-individual becomes a little bit poorer, in-
ducing a partial migration from the h-th income class to the (h−1)-th one and
the (k, β)-individual) becomes a little bit richer, inducing a partial migration
from the k-th income class to the (k + 1)-th one. The mentioned variation in
the four groups is described through the coefficients:
b
(h−1,α)
(h,α);(k,β) = ph,k S (1− θk,β)
1
rh − rh−1 ,
b
(h,α)
(h,α);(k,β) = −ph,k S (1− θk,β)
1
rh − rh−1 ,
b
(k+1,β)
(k,β);(h,α) = ph,k S (1− θk,β)
1
rk+1 − rk ,
b
(k,β)
(k,β);(h,α) = −ph,k S (1− θk,β)
1
rk+1 − rk . (8)
The coefficients in the formulae (4)− (6), namely those appearing in the equa-
tion (1) and which refer to the (j, α) group, are then obtained from these,
observing that each probability C
(j,α)
(h,β);(k,γ) can be written as a sum
C
(j,α)
(h,β);(k,γ) = a
(j,α)
(h,β);(k,γ) + b
(j,α)
(h,β);(k,γ) ,
where the “absence-of-variation term” a
(j,α)
(h,β);(k,γ) = 1 only if j = h and α = β,
independently of (k, γ), and the b
(j,α)
(h,β);(k,γ) are as in (8) (see [4] for a similar
discussion in a simpler case).
We also observe that the structure of the C
(j,α)
(h,β);(k,γ) and the T
(j,α)
[(h,β);(k,γ)](x)
in (4)−(6) and (7) is determined by the conservation requirements of the global
mechanism. The stochastic character they enjoy is due to the presence of the
coefficients ph,k which can be defined with some degrees of freedom. It is in
view of the coefficients ph,k that we call this a probabilistic micro-interaction
8 Short form of author list
modelling. We do not know who exactly is going to interact with whom: we
only know at a probabilistic level how often individuals in a group interact
with individuals of another group.
Of course, assuming that each individual of the h-th income class has the
same probability ph,k of paying in an encounter with an individual of the k-
th class corresponds to attribute the same behavior (intended as attitude to
pay) to all pairs of individuals of the same two specific classes. This reminds a
mean-field approach, see e.g. [1,2]. But, in fact, the underlying modelling just
described provides our approach with a different characterization.3 
By suitably adapting proofs, which are relative to a previous, less general,
version of the model and can be found in [4], one may check that the fol-
lowing properties, amounting to conservation in time of both the number of
individuals and the global income as well, hold true.
Property 1 For any initial condition x0 = {xα0j}j=1,...n;α=1,...m, for which xα0j ≥
0 for any j = 1, ..., n and α = 1, ...,m, and
∑n
j=1
∑m
α=1 x
α
0j = 1, a unique
solution x(t) = {xα0j (t)}j=1,...n;α=1,...m of (1) exists, which is defined for all
t ∈ [0,+∞), satisfies x(0) = x0 and also
xαj (t) ≥ 0 for j = 1, ..., n and α = 1, ...,m
and (9)
n∑
j=1
m∑
α=1
xαj (t) = 1 for all t ≥ 0 .
As a consequence of this property, the expressions of the T
(j,α)
[(h,β);(k,γ)](x)’s
in (7) somehow simplify and the right hand sides of system (1) turn out to be
in fact polynomials of degree 3.
Property 2 The scalar function µ(x) =
∑n
j=1 rj
∑m
α=1 x
α
j remains constant
along each solution of system (1).
In addition, the running of several numerical solutions provides evidence
of the following fact.
3 In the Boltzmann approach to statistical mechanics, to which our approach is inspired,
the variables are described by means of a probability distribution function. The Maxwell-
Boltzmann statistics gives the expected number of particles in a given volume of the phase
space. Space and velocity are continuous variables. The discretized Boltzmann approach is
somewhat more manageable, because it groups together particles with the same velocity
or, in the socio-economic version, individuals in the same income class. Integrals are then
replaced by sums and the number of admissible velocities or classes can be increased as
needed to ensure the precision required in any specific case. In comparison to the discretized
Boltzmann, the mean-field approach entails a loss of information, since the evolution equa-
tion for each individual implies that it interacts with an average value of all the others, and
the whole evolution process is self-consistent. In the discretized Boltzmann approach and in
our model the interactions are microscopic and occur between all individuals. Finally, if one
compares a Boltzmann approach with an agent-based simulation, it is fair to say that the
Boltzmann agents have properties typical of deterministic particles, while the behavior of
simulated agents can be much more flexible. However, the Boltzmann approach offers the
advantage of a closed mathematical formulation, independent from the software.
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Property 3 If the parameters of the model (r1, ..., rn, S, the τk’s, the θev(α)’s)
and also the fraction of individuals with different behavior4 are fixed, if µ ∈
[r1, rn] is fixed, then the solutions x(t) = {xα0j (t)}j=1,...n;α=1,...m evolving from
initial conditions x0 = {xα0j}j=1,...n;α=1,...m, for which xα0j ≥ 0 for any j =
1, ..., n and α = 1, ...,m, and which satisfy
n∑
j=1
m∑
α=1
xα0j = 1 and
n∑
j=1
rj
m∑
α=1
xα0j = µ
tend asymptotically to a same stationary distribution as t→ +∞.
3 The evidence from numerical solutions
Our specific interest here is to analyze the income evolution in the long time
limit of groups of individuals characterized by different behaviors. In other
words, whereas our previous investigation in [7,8] was especially addressed to
detect the effects of (a different kind of) tax evasion on the population as a
whole, here we also focus on the evasion effects on the different mentioned
groups.
Finding analytical solutions of the nonlinear differential equations (1) is of
course hopeless. However, numerical solutions provide sufficient information.
In order to obtain them, one has to first fix several parameters. We take here
n = 9, m = 3, S = 1, rj = 10 j for j = 1, ..., n and assume tax rates increasing
from a minimal one, τmin, to a maximal one, τmax, according to a progressive
taxation system, as given by
τj = τmin +
j − 1
n− 1 (τmax − τmin) , for j = 1, ..., n . (10)
Still, the values of τmin, τmax and θev(α) for α = 1, ...,m remain to be chosen.
Each time we explore aggregate effects in the asymptotic stationary income
distribution of the population and compare situations of tax compliance and
tax evasion, we find that evasion leads to an increment in the number of
individuals in the poorest and in the richest classes, at the detriment of the
middle classes. Fig. 1 illustrates the typical situation. In [7,8] we have shown
that tax evasion has in general the effect to increase economic inequality, as
measured for instance by the Gini index. We have also studied situations in
which evasion grows in response to an increase of the tax rates, finding an
optimal “compromise” characterized by minimum inequality. These results
were obtained in conditions of homogeneous evasion rates.
Assume now, to fix ideas, that the evasion behaviors are as in (3) in Ex-
ample 1 and that each of them is present in one third of the population. 5
4 The fraction of individuals with a specific evasion behavior is assumed here to be the
same in each income class.
5 The choice of this particular subdivision is motivated by the desire to derive a balanced
comparison of the evolution of the different groups.
10 Short form of author list
Fig. 1 Collective effect of tax evasion. The asymptotic income distribution on the left refers
to a case with tax evasion, the one in the middle refers to a tax compliance case with the
same initial conditions and the panel on the right displays the difference of the fraction of
individuals in the various classes in the first and second case. Note that the figures are scaled
differently.
Fig. 2 In the two rows the asymptotic income distribution referring to two different initial
data are plotted. The two panels on the left display the distributions by income classes. The
histograms in the central panels represent the sequence for each income class of three evasion
behavior sectors with θev(1) = 1, 1/2, 1/4. The panels on the right provide an alternative
bi-dimensional representation, in which the sectors can also be distinguished.
Accordingly, in each income class one third of the individuals pays all due
taxes, one third pays half of them and one third pays one quarter of them.
Not only can we obtain information on the aggregate shape of the asymp-
totic income distribution. We also get a more detailed picture of the effects of
tax evasion within different behavioural sectors. Specifically, it turns out that
in low income classes the numbers of “honest individuals”, “half-evaders” and
“three-quarters evaders”, counted in this order, are decreasing from the largest
to the smallest, while the situation is reversed in the high income classes. A
graphic illustration of this is provided by the Fig. 2.
In order to understand which variations of the model parameters can best
represent some real situations, and what results we can expect, we can compare
situations in which evasion is widespread with situations in which it is confined
only to a part of the population, the total evasion level being the same. By
total evasion level we denote the total fraction of tax payments which is eluded,
summed over all sectors of the population. With three sectors, for instance, we
can consider the two following situations, which have both total evasion level
1/6, but exhibit respectively widespread and concentrated evasion:
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Table 1 Percentage gap d between the average income of the worst evaders and the average
income of honest taxpayers in dependence of the total evasion level η. A gradual spread of
evasion in three behavioral sectors is assumed. For instance, when the total evasion level is
10% (the first sector pays 100% of the due taxes, the second pays 90% and the third 80%),
the average income of the third sector is 6.8% larger than the income of the first sector. The
applied tax rates grow linearly with income between τmin = 10% and τmax = 45%. The
dependence d(η) can be approx. fitted as d(η) ' 0.42η2 + 0.62η.
Tot. % evasion level η % of due taxes paid in the three sectors % income gap d
5 100, 95, 90 3.5
10 100, 90, 80 6.8
15 100, 85, 70 10.8
20 100, 80, 60 14.6
25 100, 75, 50 18.1
30 100, 70, 40 21.5
40 100, 60, 20 31.8
50 100, 50, 0 41.8
1. one sector is honest, with θ = θev = 1, i.e. 100% of taxes are paid, while
the other two sectors are slightly dishonest, with θ = 0.75, i.e. 75% of taxes
are paid;
2. two sectors are honest and the third is quite dishonest, with θ = 0.5.
We wonder whether the Gini index is significantly different in the two cases,
or in other words, if evasion has a different impact on inequality when it is
widespread or confined to a part of the population. Furthermore, we might
wonder whether the partial Gini indices of the behavioral sectors are substan-
tially different from that of the total population, for instance in the sense that
among evaders there is more inequality than among honest taxpayers. The nu-
merical solutions show, however, that in all these cases the Gini index does not
exhibit any significant variations, depending only on the total evasion level.
The introduction of behavioral sectors into the model allows to observe
another important effect, namely the appearance of a clear difference between
the average incomes of honest taxpayers and tax evaders. It is already apparent
from the income histograms in Fig. 2 that, as expected, tax evaders tend to get
richer than honest taxpayers: the bars representing the lowest-income classes
clearly show a larger share of honest people, while the opposite happens for
the highest-income classes, where more evaders are found. It is interesting to
give a quantitative estimate of this difference and to study its dependence on
the evasion level.
To this end, let us consider the relative difference d between the average
income of the worst evaders and the average income of the honest taxpayers:
d = (µm−µ1)/µ1. This relative difference is quite large, typically of the order
of 10 to 20% in the histograms of Fig.s 1, 2. In order to evaluate its dependence
on the evasion level, we need to choose a fixed and reasonable “evasion spread”
pattern.
We can proceed as follows: suppose that the first sector is always honest
(θ = 1), the second sector has θ = 1− η (evasion level η), and the third sector
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has θ = 1 − 2η (evasion level 2η). The total evasion level is 3η/3 = η. Let us
gradually increase η, from 0 to 0.5, and compute d(η). Results are shown in
Tab. 1.
The dependence is manifestly non-linear, showing that the phenomenon
is complex and its interpretation not simple. In fact, an increase in the eva-
sion level affects the income distribution in at least two ways: (a) through
direct interactions, because evaders gain systematically more from any inter-
action; (b) through indirect interactions (tax redistribution), because when
tax evaders tend to outnumber honest taxpayers in the higher-income classes,
which should pay higher tax rates, the total tax collection is diminished. It is
not obvious, however, that this diminution should further increase the differ-
ence d(η) defined above, since in the present version of the model redistribution
is uniform. In the version with heterogeneous redistribution [9] we could take
into account more subtle real effects: for instance, supposing that welfare pro-
visions are means-tested, we could assign them based on the tax paid, instead
than on the real income. This is known to give a further unjust and detestable
advantage to tax evaders. We plan to address these issues in future work.
4 Concluding remarks and further perspectives
In this paper, a kinetic-type model describing economic interactions, taxation
and redistribution in a closed society is discussed. The focus is on the effects
produced by tax evasion by individuals who under-declare their income in
different measure.
The model suggests the following considerations. From the sound point of
view of individuals who care for society, tax compliance plays an important
role towards the overcoming of economic inequality. From the point of view
of selfish individuals, the probability of improving their own economic status
is higher when evading. The result is not surprising. Certainly, it has to be
noticed that no audit actions or punishment are taken here into consideration.
Incorporating them in the model and investigating possible impacts would be
an interesting point to explore in future work.
Another, related, point which deserves further work is the necessity of in-
clusion into the model of possible changes of the behavioral taxpayer attitudes.
Of course, in real life, the propensity of individuals to be compliant or non
compliant does not remain always constant in time: in particular, it can be
influenced by the behavior of others and by specific experiences (such as fines)
with fiscal agencies. Combining into the model the treatment of the money dis-
tributional aspect with behavioral and psychological factors remains a major
challenge to be faced in the future. As well, the possibility of bankruptcy and
production should be taken into account in an effort of an improved realism.
In this connection and in conclusion, we like to emphasize that our goal here
has been mainly a methodological one. The interest of this model (possibly
bound to be further enhanced) lies in our opinion in its possible explorative
use: simulations corresponding to different conceivable parameters allow to
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understand and forecast the emergence of different scenarios and could possibly
suggest policies addressed to favour desired trends or prevent undesired ones.
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